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Abstract: 
The concept of “Discernment politeness” stems from research undertaken in the 1980s 
on the Japanese phenomenon of wakimae. Since the earliest work on the phenomenon 
by Hill et al. (1986) and Ide (1989, 1992), many scholars have looked to further explore 
Discernment across cultures (i.e. Kádár and Mills 2013; Kádár and Paternoster 2015; 
Ridealgh and Jucker 2019). Fundamentally, Discernment has been approached as 
expected (and quasi-mandatory) behavioural norms used by subordinates towards their 
superiors within a communicative act, dictated by the socio-cultural context of the 
interaction (Ridealgh and Jucker 2019). What becomes apparent, when studying ancient 
languages, is that due to the hierarchical nature of remote societies, Discernment 
includes a complementary dimension, an opposing phenomenon to deference, equally 
visible in interpersonal interactions, which has its foundation within the Power variable. 
This paper explores this opposing phenomenon (i.e. expected or permitted language 
used by superiors to their subordinates as a manifestation of their Power), which we call 
“Potestas”, within the context of Late Egyptian and Old Latin, in order to highlight the 
phenomenon, its forms of expression in these two languages, the gaps in regards to the 




A potential problem we face when studying politeness in ancient languages (by ancient 
we refer to those languages and cultures which existed during the BCE period; Kádár 
and Ridealgh 2019: 176) is that traditional politeness approaches often consider the 
social variable of Power as both negotiable (Locher 2015: 6) and being viewed equally 
with social Distance in analyses (e.g., Conlan 2005). The challenge with ancient 
languages is that for the firmly hierarchical societies of the ancient world, Power, for the 
most part, was a fixed phenomenon and not negotiated between interlocutors within 
interactions. It is also a difficult task to view Power in conjunction with social Distance, 
when so much essential relational information is either missing or fragmented. This paper 
seeks to develop the role that Power should play within a theory of (im)politeness, 
especially when dealing with ancient linguacultures, and by doing so looks to highlight 
some of the gaps within traditional approaches when it comes to the impact Power can 
have within a relationship dynamic. Approaching this topic from the concept of 
Discernment politeness, which is usually applied to explain the dyadic relationship 
between subordinate and superior, we will argue that Power supports a pre-patterned 
discursive practice of superiors towards their subordinates. According to this pattern, the 
high-Power individual does not need to satisfy the facewants of the low-Power individual, 
and although this could be perceived as a Face-Threatening Act (henceforth FTA) 
outside of this specific dynamic, this action does not affect the successful continuation 
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of the broader relationship. If we understand “discernment” as “the socially dominant 
norms of relationally constructive conventional and ritualistic behaviour” (Kádár and Mills 
2013: 143), which has its roots within the perceived dynamic of the relationship, we 
cannot overlook the superior-subordinate dynamic, an interpersonal scenario that has 
not received much attention in the theorisation of politeness, likely because the kind of 
linguistic behaviour characteristic of superiors (or better put, the linguistic behaviour that 
reveals hierarchical superiority) has traditionally been understood as being opposite to 
politeness.  
Thus, our claim in this paper will be that there is a distinct opposing phenomenon to 
deference, a linguistic behavioural pattern that we call “Potestas”, which helps to index 
the superior-subordinate dynamic. This complementary phenomenon functions contrarily 
but comparably to deference, in regard to how it minimalizes facework and prioritises 
social status. Although Potestas cannot be considered, strictly speaking, a polite 
phenomenon in itself, nor a manifestation of impoliteness, it should be taken into account 
within a theory of (im)politeness, in particular one that looks to reflect the sociolinguistic 
features of ancient linguacultures. 
We will utilise evidence from two ancient languages, Late Egyptian and Old Latin, to 
demonstrate the role Potestas plays in relationships with a clear Power imbalance. Both 
deference and Potestas, as the two sides of the same coin, are particularly applicable to 
historically remote languages and cultures due to the marked hierarchical nature of these 
societies. An important point to address in this paper is that although deference is fully 
incorporated into (Im)politeness Research (especially the approaches dealing with 
Discernment politeness), the phenomenon that we call Potestas, even if it is not in 
essence a ‘polite’ phenomenon, but a behavioural pattern, determines a certain kind of 
relationship, and should be taken into account in order to correctly assess that type of 
interpersonal exchange. As such, we look to address its relationship with (Im)politeness 
Research. Several scholars have already sought to accommodate Power and Hierarchy 
in (Im)Politeness Research, yet fundamentally fail to convey its importance, as the 
majority of such attempts look to build these factors into Brown and Levinson’s (1987) 
existing framework of face (i.e. Morand 1996, 2000; Yabuuchi 2006; see Locher 2004 
for alternative approaches). However, as we will look to demonstrate, face and Power 
are two distinct, although overlapping, dimensions of interpersonal relations, and must 
be treated separately. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of Power and 
its importance in interpersonal pragmatics and tackle the way politeness theories have 
managed to introduce the variable of Power in their analysis. We will pay special 
attention to Brown and Levison’s (1987) classical model (Section 2.1), to Discernment 
politeness (Section 2.2), and to Terkourafi’s Frame Theory (Section 2.3). In Section 3, 
we define our concept of Potestas, a second-order theoretical tool that we use to 
encapsulate the dynamics of the superior-subordinate relationship. Section 4 explores 
Potestas in the context of two ancient linguacultures, Late Egyptian (Section 4.1) and 
Old Latin (Section 4.2), and analyses the unfolding of Power in two different but 
comparable pieces of evidence (private letters in the case of Late Egyptian and literary 
works in the case of Old Latin). Finally, Section 5 discusses the findings of the research, 
points to the possibility of its wider applicability beyond ancient linguacultures and 
presents the conclusions of the paper. 
 
 
2. Limitation of Power as an extra-linguistic factor within 
(im)politeness approaches 
As Spencer-Oatey (1997: 284) highlights, “unequal relationships occur in all societies”, 
yet are particularly visible through a historic lens in historically remote cultures, since 
they tended to be far more stratified than modern Western societies. Power has long 
been considered a key concept in (Im)politeness Research and holds a central place 
within classical politeness theories such as Brown and Levinson (1987).2 Brown and 
Gilman (1960), in their study of the so-called T/V pronominal distinction (from Latin 
tu/vos), offered one of the most influential definitions of this concept for linguistic 
research:3 
One person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he [sic] is 
able to control the behavior of the other. Power is a relationship between at least 
two persons, and it is nonreciprocal in the sense that both cannot have power in 
the same area of behavior. There are many bases of power — physical strength, 
wealth, age, sex, institutionalized role in the church, the state, the army or within 
the family. (Brown and Gilman 1960: 255) 
Although today social Power is universally recognised as an important factor in 
interpersonal pragmatics, there is often the connotation within modern languages that 
Power is not a solely influencing factor (at least not the most influencing one), that it can 
be negotiated, and combined, nuanced or mitigated with other social variables. This 
stems in part from work by Emerson (1962), Foucault (1976: 124), Hofstede (1986: 307), 
and Searle (1995), which claim that “power comes from below”, thus, as Leezenberg 
(2002: 899) clarifies, “it is not imposed from above in the force of domination by a 
sovereign, but arises from the collective action, or interaction, of the different social 
actors involved”. This conception, characteristic of Social Psychological studies (see, for 
instance, Keltner et al. 2008), implies that Power is predominantly granted by the 
subordinates. This understanding of Power is inherently flawed, particularly for the 
ancient world, where social structures ensured and perpetuated the assignment of Power 
to certain individuals, and it was afforded through membership to social groups with 
economic and political pre-eminence. It is also inadequate for modern interactions, as 
encapsulated by Molm in the following quote.  
Not only does mutual dependence bring people together, however; it also provides 
the structural basis for power: one actor's dependence is the source of another's 
power. To the extent that dependence is mutual, actors in social relations have 
power over each other. And, to the extent that their dependencies are unequal, their 
relation will also be unequal, in terms of the benefits that each contributes and 
receives. More powerful, less dependent actors will enjoy greater benefits at lower 
cost. (Molm 1997: 1) 
Here, Molm (1997: 2) calls upon ideas from Social Exchange Theory, which places 
importance on ties of mutual dependency that underlie all social structures. 
 
2 Harris (2003); Holmes and Stubbe (2003); Locher (2004); Mullany (2004); or the papers in 
Bousfield and Locher (2008), among others, deal with the intersection between Power and 
(im)politeness. 
3 For an overview, and a critical assessment of the variables Power and Distance in Linguistics 
and Social Psychological research, see Spencer-Oatey (1996). Regarding Power, see also 
Locher (2004: 9–43) and Vine (2004). 
 
 
It was originally Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) insight, however, that the structural 
condition that provides for the basis of structure exchange — the mutual dependence 
of actors on each other — also provides the basis for power. Relations of 
dependence bring people together (to the extent that people are mutually dependent, 
they are more likely to form relations and to continue them), but they also create 
inequalities in power (unequal dependencies give less dependent actors an 
advantage in the relation). (Molm 1997: 29) 
This approach implies that Power focuses on the relationship between actors, resources 
— i.e. “capacities to perform behaviours that produce valued outcomes for others” (Molm 
1997: 16) —, and the structure and process of the exchange.4 In the view of this theory, 
it is the low-risk/low-dependency actor who is perceived to have the most Power in this 
type of interactional exchange. 
2.1. Brown and Levinson and Power 
In Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model Power is, together with social Distance (D) and 
the absolute Ranking of impositions in the particular culture (R), one of the sociological 
variables that must be taken into account to assess the seriousness of an FTA. In their 
well-known formula to calculate the weightiness of a given FTA, that is, its seriousness, 
the three dimensions are placed on an equal footing, and the weightiness is calculated 
on a “simple summative basis” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 76). As they conceive it, “the 
function must capture the fact that all three dimensions P, D, and R contribute to the 
seriousness of an FTA, and thus to a determination of the level of politeness with which, 
other things being equal, an FTA will be communicated” (ibid.). However, as we will try 
to demonstrate through the evidence of two ancient languages (Section 4), there are 
specific contexts, determined by a relationship status, in which P is the overarching 
variable, causing the other two variables to become irrelevant (as well as the facewants 
of the low-Power individual). 
Brown and Levinson’s definition of Power is as follows: 
P is an asymmetric social dimension of relative power, roughly in Weber’s sense. 
That is, P(H,S) is the degree to which H can impose his own plans and his own self-
evaluation (face) at the expense of S’s plans and self-evaluation. In general there 
are two sources of P, either of which may be authorized or unauthorized — material 
control (over economic distribution and physical force) and metaphysical control 
(over the actions of others, by virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those 
others). In most cases an individual’s power is drawn from both these sources, or is 
thought to overlap them. The reflex of a great P differential is perhaps archetypally 
‘deference’ […]. (Brown and Levinson 1987: 77) 
According to their view, these variables are sensitive to context and heavily depend on 
situational factors. For Brown and Levinson, Power interests fundamentally as a 
justification for deference. Thus, the difference in Power justifies the degree of 
elaboration and presence of politeness markers and deferential comportment, as in their 
exemplifying pair ‘Excuse me sir, would it be all right if I smoke?’ and ‘Mind if I smoke?’. 
If D and R are constant and have small values, then 
Our intuitions are that [1. Excuse me sir, would it be all right if I smoke?] might be 
said by an employee to his boss, while [2. Mind if I smoke?] might be said by the 
boss to the employee in the same situation. Here, then, P is the only variable that 
 
4 This is not cost/benefit exchange. 
 
 
changes from [1] to [2] (more exactly, P of H over S), and this again lessens Wx 
which provides S with the reasons for his choice between [1] and [2] for his linguistic 
encoding. (Brown and Levinson 1987: 80) 
In both examples, a certain degree of politeness can be recognized, and even if the 
boss’s utterance is less elaborated and includes less conventionalized politeness 
markers, it can still be considered polite, starting from the very fact that s/he is asking a 
subordinate for permission to smoke. However, when the speaker’s Power is notably 
higher than that of the addressee, then the speaker can bypass the need for face-
redressive strategies. This is, in fact, one of the possibilities that these scholars foresee 
for doing a bald on-record act (this is the third possibility in the following quote): 
Doing an act baldly, without redress, involves doing it in the most direct, clear, 
unambiguous and concise way possible (for example, for a request, saying ‘Do X!’). 
[…] Normally, an FTA will be done in this way only if the speaker does not fear 
retribution from the addressee, for example in circumstances where (a) S and H both 
tacitly agree that the relevance of face demands may be suspended in the interests 
of urgency or efficiency; (b) where the danger to H’s face is very small, as in offers, 
requests, suggestions that are clearly in H’s interest and do not require great 
sacrifices of S (e.g., ‘Come in’ or ‘Do sit down’); and (c) where S is vastly superior in 
power to H, or can enlist audience support to destroy H’s face without losing his own. 
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 69) 
From these three possibilities, the one dealing with power differences is the only that 
implies the addressee’s face-losing, or at least a lack of interest from the speaker 
towards the maintenance of the former’s face. Even if Brown and Levinson do not 
explicitly identify these kinds of acts as impolite, the lack of politeness markers is 
somehow linked with rude behavior by these scholars.5 Nevertheless, as we will discuss 
in greater detail later in this paper, even if Power is maximum — a circumstance that in 
ancient linguacultures causes the other sociological variables to become irrelevant and 
allows the complete absence of politeness markers —, the superior’s expected 
discursive practice has nothing to do with impoliteness, and cannot be characterized as 
such. Rather, in ancient societies, the imbalance of Power legitimizes the fact that the 
face of the subordinate becomes irrelevant. 
2.2. Discernment and Power 
The theorisation on the interpersonal phenomenon of Discernment stems from work 
conducted on Japanese honorifics in the 1980s (Hill et al. 1986; Ide 1989, 1992). This 
work, which arose to oppose the universalistic claims of the politeness model proposed 
by Brown and Levinson (1987), argued that the selection of an honorific was not strategic 
on the part of the speaker, but rather a “quasi-mandatory selection of the appropriate 
linguistic item based on the social context of the interaction” (Ridealgh and Jucker 2019: 
57). Hence, in highly hierarchical societies, within interactions where Discernment takes 
place, the linguistic behaviour that indexes the social status of the hearer is prioritised 
over individual facework. The definition of face is contested, with Brown and Levinson’s 
 
5 See, for instance, Brown and Levinson (1987: 97): “Another set of cases where non-redress 
occurs is where S’s want to satisfy H’s face is small, either because S is powerful and does not 
fear retaliation or non-cooperation from H […] or because S wants to be rude, or doesn’t care 
about maintaining face.” In the same vein, the presentation of keywords in the subject index 




(1978: 65–66) definition of the concept as an individual’s public self-image, which 
“consists in a set of wants satisfiable only by the actions of others”, often taking precedent 
(Sifianou 2011: 44). This is based on earlier work by Goffman (1972), who argued that 
face is the self-image a person projects, which is co-constructed in social interaction. As 
Sifianou (2011: 44) points out, both these concepts of face “recognise that for an 
interaction to succeed both respect of self and consideration for the other are needed”. 
This requires a strategic use of Face-Enhancing Acts and FTAs to be utilised in a 
communicative event where the relationship dynamics are both fluid and continually 
renegotiated. This is not the case for Discernment, where hierarchy and (social) Power 
play an overarching role, restricting and framing the interaction. Although Discernment 
has previously been linked with the Japanese concept wakimae in academic literature 
(i.e. Matsumoto 1988, 1989, 1993), it is now considered that wakimae is the Japanese 
localization of Discernment. Thus, Discernment itself refers to an established theoretical, 
second-order politeness concept, which needs to be evaluated and considered on an 
individual cultural level (Pizziconi 2003; Kádár and Mills 2013; Kádár and Paternoster 
2015; Ridealgh and Jucker 2019). 
During the initial phase of research on Discernment, Hill et al. (1986, followed by Ide 
1989) proposed that the opposing phenomenon to Discernment was Volition. 
Complementary to Discernment is the aspect of politeness which allows the speaker 
a considerably more active choice, according to the speaker’s intention, from a 
relatively wider range of possibilities. We call this Volition. (Hill et al. 1986: 348) 
They went on to argue that Discernment and Volition were apparent in opposing degrees 
within Japanese and American-English politeness: 
Our broad claim is that in all sociolinguistic systems there exists a sub-system for 
polite use of language which has at least two components. The first is the operation 
of Discernment, the second, Volition. Discernment must be considered as first 
because to ignore its requirements brings social punishment; that is, violations of the 
rules of Discernment offend others and thus hurt the speaker’s social image. Within 
the sociolinguistic system, one must observe the social rule of Discernment. We 
might say that this (set of) rule(s) defines one’s minimal obligations within the polite-
use sub-system. Volition, on the other hand, defines a range of permissible 
modifications to the former: one may, but need not, adopt an alternate use in order 
to be acceptably polite. That is, the criteria or considerations addressed by Volition 
are optional from the stand-point of universal pragmatic strategy. The specific 
strategies by which individual sociolinguistic systems implement Volition will, of 
course, differ. (Hill et al. 1986: 351) 
As Ide (1992: 303) herself stresses, “the major difference in the two types of linguistic 
politeness, wakimae and Volition, lies in the targets of politeness. In wakimae, politeness 
is oriented to social norms, whilst in Volition it is oriented to the face of the individual 
addressee”. This opposition of Discernment and Volition has received strong criticism 
(Pizziconi 2003: 1500), and rightly so as it oversimplifies cultures and the polarization of 
their politeness systems (Kádár and Mills 2013: 137–140). Rather, as argued by 
Ridealgh and Jucker (2019: 65), Discernment and Volition need to be used together in 
order to critically assess politeness phenomena. This is particularly relevant for ancient 
languages, where often surviving data is sporadic and somewhat random, and so it is 




Recently, Ridealgh and Jucker (2019: 65) proposed that “Discernment is an essential 
tool that helps us to assess and understand the subordinate-superior relationship 
dynamic” typical of many ancient cultures. This viewpoint places emphasis on the 
relationship itself between the interlocutors and how they perceive their relationship. This 
was something already addressed by Hill et al. in their original research in the 1980s, 
but not widely discussed: 
Perceived Distance is the distance perceived by a speaker to exist between the self 
and a particular addressee in a particular situation and operating in a shared 
sociolinguistic milieu. This perception is the fundamental element, we believe, which 
determines a speaker’s specific choices in his/her polite use of language. PD also 
covers the additional factor of degree of imposition (DI) of a request, which has the 
effect of modifying the linguistic choice that consideration of addressee status and 
situation, operating alone, would produce. Thus PD is the sum of the factors of 
addressee status and situation and DI. (Hill et al. 1986: 351) 
What we seek to do in this paper is to expand on these arguments in order to correctly 
assess the concept of Discernment politeness, which linguistically materialises the 
perceived dynamic of any interpersonal relationship. Thus, when dealing with an unequal 
relationship, we should look not only at the subordinate-superior relationship, but also to 
the superior-subordinate dynamic. Both are complementary patterns around which any 
dyadic relationship with Power inequality pivots, especially in highly hierarchical 
societies. We argue that there is a distinct phenomenon, which we call Potestas, which 
helps to index the superior-subordinate dynamic. This phenomenon is complementary 
with deference and functions in the same way as it in regard to how it minimalizes 
facework and prioritises social status or Power.  
2.3. Frame Theory and Power 
In many ways, what we are arguing here about the culturally-specific dominance of 
Power within superior-subordinate relationship dynamics overlaps with Terkourafi’s 
(1995, 2005) Frame Theory. Terkourafi (1999: 107) highlights that “an internal view of 
context and the notion of frames further allow us to account for ‘politeness default values’ 
assigned to linguistic forms in any given culture”. Terkourafi goes on to develop this 
further: 
The situated appropriateness of a linguistic device necessitates explicit reference to 
the norms operating at any one time in the community in question. To represent 
these norms, the notion of a frame is proposed as combining information about the 
situation with information about the appropriate use of language therein. Frames act 
as a pointer as to what constitutes normal circumstances in different situations for 
different communities. (Terkourafi 2005: 112–113) 
Within her publications, Terkourafi (especially 1999, 2005) underpins Frame Theory with 
the role extra-linguistic factors play in determining how an interaction is deemed to be 
(im)polite, including the construction of FTAs and their weighting (Terkourafi 2005: 113). 
Power and Social Distance are two of these variables that are viewed and assessed 
together when making observations regarding polite usage of a situation: 
Before attempting to account for the distribution of various SMs in the data using the 
formula Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76), note that, by 
looking at requests performed for the first time, where the predicated act is 
 
 
expressed by an AV/SAV6 in the main clause of the utterance, we are in fact 
controlling for the variable of Ranking of the imposition. Rx is generally held constant 
at low values throughout the data, given that subjects were always aware of being 
recorded, which avowedly led them to avoid acts of high R. This puts the onus of 
accounting for the results of the analysis on the other two variables, the Distance 
between the speaker and the hearer, and the Power of the hearer over the speaker. 
(Terkourafi 2005: 103) 
Terkourafi is aware of the limitations of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) approach, and she 
tries to overcome them: 
The difficulties in operationalising Brown and Levinson’s sociological variables of 
Power and Distance (and, by implication, their proposed formula for computing the 
weightiness of an FTAx), are likely to be alleviated when the various extra-linguistic 
variables discussed above as ‘sources’ of Power and Distance are considered 
jointly, rather than in isolation from each other. The onus of proof now lies on the 
side of those who would like to claim that Power and Distance thus understood (as 
clusters of extra-linguistic variables) are endowed with psychological reality above 
and beyond that of being the sum of their parts (as Brown & Levinson would seem 
to imply, when they discuss the formula yielding Wx as “at least a partially accurate 
representation of cognitive process” (1987: 81), or when they attribute specific 
assumptions to the speaker regarding the social Distance between himself and the 
hearer, the Power of the hearer over him, and the culture-dependent ranking of the 
FTA in question (1987:74–75)). (Terkourafi 2005: 106–107) 
In this way, Frame Theory can be used to explore and assess culturally specific 
behaviour grounded within localised and default value systems and how this is displayed 
through linguistic patterns (both strategic and unmarked) within interactions.  
Note that, because frames combine information about both the extralinguistic 
features of a situation, and the appropriate use of language therein, whichever of 
these is available first will give rise to expectations about the other. In this way, we 
can account for politeness assessments of utterances produced and interpreted in 
the course of an actual situation (where expectations are set up with recourse to the 
extra-linguistic features of the situation); but also, for politeness default values which 
cultures attribute to specific linguistic behaviours seemingly independently of context 
(where expectations are set up with recourse to linguistic information). Furthermore, 
once the similarity driving the matching of perceived information and information 
stored in memory is construed as a matter of degree, along the lines of G. Lakoff 
(1987), the proposed approach turns out to be constraining enough to account for 
diverging politeness assessments of formally equivalent linguistic devices by 
different cultures, while at the same time being general enough to allow for the 
observed creativity of linguistic politeness. (Terkourafi 2005: 111) 
Where we find difficulty with the blanket use of Frame Theory and the linguistic 
phenomenon found in the ancient data is the interdependency of Power and Social 
Distance, and the foundational need to assess both of these aspects together and with 
equal consideration. Within the examples discussed below (Section 4), Power over-rides 
any other social variable that could influence the interaction. Although Terkourafi (2005: 
105) does look to address this with regards to how much weighting social variables were 
given within an interaction, all variables are still considered within these analyses; the 
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inclusivity of Frame Theory is perhaps too broad to discuss and explore one dominant 
independent social variable, although similar methodology approaches are certainly 
compatible. 
3. Defining the concept of Potestas 
For the ancient data, discussed below (Section 4), we look to identify superior-
subordinate interactions outside of the framework of Brown and Levinson (1987) within 
a broad range of texts, taking inspiration from Discernment politeness and the review of 
Power inequalities reflected in linguistic patterns. We use the term Potestas to 
encapsulate the life-depending reliance low-Power individuals have on high-Power 
superiors. This dependency is manifested in the linguistic behaviour intended to display 
hierarchical superiority towards someone who is in a lower position on the social scale. 
The word itself originates from Latin and is usually rendered as “power”. The Oxford Latin 
Dictionary glosses potestas, in its first meaning, as “possession of control or command 
(over persons or things)”, a level of control closely linked to the Roman magistracy 
system. Potestas also described the power of the father over his children and, in general, 
over all the members of his family (patria potestas). What is apparent from the Latin 
context, is that potestas was a quality largely granted by a public office or a certain social 
role. As Götter (2008) points out: 
[E]very aspect of potestas was emphatically part of Rome’s legal discourse. Roman 
law simultaneously guaranteed and limited its exercise. A good translation of 
potestas into English would therefore be ‘the right to give orders’. Ideally, the 
assertion of potestas should not require physical coercion; rather, it was expected 
that a command from someone holding a magistracy, or performing a social role 
that was endowed with potestas, was met with obedience. (Götter 2008: 200)7 
It could be argued that the word potestas describes a Latin emic concept of power 
regarding the functioning of Roman society, and that its meaning in that language is more 
a faculty than a behaviour, hence it cannot be used outside the limits of that very culture. 
Nevertheless, according to our proposal, in this paper we use Potestas as a theoretical 
second-order concept, to define a specific relational and linguistic behaviour vis-à-vis 
interpersonal dynamics: one that characterises the superior-subordinate relationship. 
Our concept of Potestas is based upon two key principles: 1) that the interaction 
exchange is shaped by Power and not individual facewants (which are irrelevant from 
the viewpoint of the superior);8 2) that the ability of the high-Power individual to utilise a 
range of linguistic forms, many of which could be interpreted as FTAs outside of the 
unequal relationship, does not impact on the continued maintenance of the relationship. 
In the next two Sections, we will explore the linguistic manifestations of this concept in 
two remote languages: Late Egyptian and Old Latin. 
We look here to highlight and coin the linguistic phenomenon Potestas, which we argue 
is part of Discernment and the opposing phenomenon to deference, as represented in 
Figure 1. We define Potestas as a concept that encapsulates reflective quasi-
authoritative and dominant linguistic forms used by high-Power individuals within fixed 
 
7 Nevertheless, as it will be illustrated in Section 4.2, in ancient Rome physical punishment 
collaborated in the holding of Potestas, at least within the relation master-slave.  
8 Even if allegedly the Power of the superior individual could be threatened, as happened in 
ancient China; see in Shen and Chen (2019) an analysis of the Chinese speech act of jian, which 
is considered a Power-Threatening Act. 
 
 
hierarchical cultural contexts. In contrast, deference can be seen to reflect quasi-
mandatory and submissive linguistic features of low-Power individuals towards high-
Power individuals (Ridealgh and Jucker 2019). In neither of these cases is facework 
necessary for the maintenance of the relationship. So, the complementary relation 
between deference and Potestas functions as an alternative (or complementary) model 
to face management behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 1. The complementarity Deference/Potestas model 
 
Potestas, however, does present a quandary for (im)politeness researchers in the sense 
that its relationship to politeness is at first sight somewhat tenuous. Certainly, Potestas 
is part of interpersonal pragmatics, in that it has a key role to play in maintaining unequal 
relationships, yet we will argue here that, as a constituting part of Discernment, it also 
has a place within (Im)politeness Research as well. 
An interesting feature of Potestas is that utterances which could be perceived as being 
FTAs in other contexts are not necessarily interpreted in the same manner within 
superior-subordinate relationships, especially those where the reliance on the superior 
individual is high. The relationship is maintained regardless of the intent or content of the 
utterance; the cognitive reception of the utterance is altered by the relationship dynamic. 
As such, and given the role of Power in the social structures of Antiquity, Potestas is not 
negatively marked within the frame of ancient societies, and can be considered as an 
expected discursive practice by superiors towards their subordinates. 
4. Exploring Potestas in context 
In this section, we present a situated analysis of Potestas within two different contexts 
from the ancient world: Late Egyptian and Old Latin, two distant and unrelated 
linguacultures, to demonstrate the applicability of this second-order theoretical tool to the 
study of ancient (im)politeness. 
4.1. Late Egyptian 
Ancient Egyptian language is one of the longest, continually attested languages in the 
world (Chinese is the other) and falls into the Afro-Asiatic language family. It first 
appeared in writing shortly before 3000BCE and then remained active until the eleventh 
century CE (Allen 2001: 1) and is of course a dead language today. During its period of 
use, Ancient Egyptian went through five evolutionary stages: Old Egyptian, Middle 
Egyptian, Late Egyptian, Demotic and Coptic, which is still used today within the Coptic 
Christian Church. It could also be written using two different writing scripts, the famous 







own alphabet derived from Greek). Within this paper, the focus of analysis is on texts 
written in Late Egyptian, which was used as a written form of the language between 
1300‒600BCE, although it was likely used as a spoken language from 1600BCE 
onwards (Allen 2001: 1; Junge 2005: 17‒24).  
The ancient Egyptian Late Ramesside Letters are a corpus of over seventy published 
letters written in Late Egyptian Hieratic, which date to the reign of the last New Kingdom 
King, Ramesses XI (c.1099‒1069BCE). The letters reveal the daily lives and 
communications of a community of scribes and their families living on the Theban West 
Bank (modern-day Luxor). Within the letter corpus, social status of the interlocutor is 
reflected not only in the utterances included in the texts but also the construction of the 
letters themselves. Senders of letters who were socially superior to the recipient of their 
letter generally used a reduced formal introduction and a higher frequency of directives, 
whilst subordinate letter senders utilised longer formal introductions and more indirect or 
elaborated request acts (Ridealgh 2013a, 2016). This linguistic structure reflects the 
hierarchical nature of ancient Egyptian society, which saw the king as leader supreme, 
only usurped in power by the gods (ideologically, not necessary a reality at all times). 
Even on a more domestic level, a head of household would be responsible for everyone 
who lived under their domain, expected to protect, clothe and feed any who were 
household members, in exchange for their support in maintaining to daily activities of the 
household.   
Potestas, as a linguistic phenomenon, is visible in letters sent by individuals who assume 
high-Power status between the interlocutors. Example (1) highlights a letter sent by the 
most senior individual included in the corpus, the General Piankh. Piankh’s letters 
epitomise the superior style letter format: no formal introduction, just an address, 
directive-orientated, and no use of concluding formulae for finishing the letter (for 
subordinate letter styles, see Ridealgh 2013a). The example below represents a full letter 
sent by Piankh to a subordinate named Payshuweben in regard to the torture and murder 
of two Medjay (desert policemen) who were causing some type of civil unrest.  
(1) (j)m(j)-ro mSo n pr o# onX wD# snb n rwD(.w) p#.y-Sw-wbn Hno-Dd sDm=j md(w).t nb 
j.h#b=k Hr=w p# Dd j.jrj=k t# md(w).t p# mD#.y 2 r-Dd Dd=w n#y md(w).t j.jrj wo jrm 
nDm sS Vry m-mj.tt mtw=k h#b mtw=k Dj.t j.jnj.tw p#y mD#.y 2 r pr=j mtw=k jnj pH.wj 
n#y=w md(w).t m-Ss zp-2 mtw=k xdb mtw=k X#o=w p# mw m grH jw m-dj om r(m)T nb 
p#y t# jm=w 
The General of the Pharaoh, Life, Prosperity, and Health, to the Agent 
Payshuweben. Furthermore, I have heard all the matters you wrote about. As for 
mention you made of this matter of these two Medjay, saying “They spoke these 
words”. Join up with Nedjemet and the Scribe Tjaroy as well. And send word. 
And bring these two Medjay to my house. And get to the bottom of their words 
quickly! And kill [them]. And throw [them] [into] the water at night. Do not let 
anyone in this land find out about it.9 
The letter contains a string of directives without any mitigation, reinforced by words 
designed to act as time intensifiers (i.e. “quickly”). This was a normal occurrence for 
superior letter types, reflecting socially normative and conventionalised behaviour: good 
 
9 Translations are the author’s own as are any errors contained within; all translations are 
comparable with Wente’s (1967, 1990). P. Berlin 10488: Černý (1939: 53–54); Wente (1967: 69; 
1990: 183).  
 
 
subordinates must (promptly) complete the requests made to them by their superiors. 
Additionally, to the end of the letter is the utterance “Do not let anyone in this land find 
out about it” (jw m-dj om r(m)T nb p#y t# jm=w), which acts as a threat or warning to not let 
anyone else know what has transpired. Requests themselves can often be viewed as 
FTAs, but threats certainly are, and both constitute an important part of the facework 
framework established by Brown and Levinson (1987). However, in this case, the Face-
Threat, rather than needing to be mitigated, is simply not relevant within this relationship 
dynamic — Power is the overarching feature. Hence, this is not an FTA but rather part 
of superior linguistic features, which could be utilised when communicating with a 
subordinate individual. It is a linguistic display and reinforcement of Power.  
A similar linguistic feature can be seen in the following Example (2), which represents a 
complete letter sent by the General Piankh to the Necropolis Scribe Dhutmose, referred 
to here by his nickname Tjaroy. In this example, the directives are followed by the phrase 
“Oh! You should know it”, which appears slightly removed from the rest of the text in the 
letter to also visually reinforce the utterance.  
(2) p# (j)m(j)-ro mSo n pr o# onX wD# snb n sS Vry n p# Xr Hno-Dd jX t# md(w).t n […]=j n p# 
Xr j.wn Dj.t oq.w n# mSwS orm mtw=k tm Dj.t Dj.t=w n=w oq.w m t# wnw.t wnn so.t=j 
spr r=k jw=k ptr p# wn.w Dj.t [oq].w n n# mSwS orw mtw=k swD.t=w n #X-mnw r Dj.t 
sdj.y=f oq.w n mSwS m-dj.w jX rX=k sw 
The General of the Pharaoh, Life, Prosperity, and Health, to the Scribe of the 
Necropolis Tjaroy. Furthermore, what is the matter with the […] of the Necropolis, 
who usually give bread-rations to the nearby Meshwesh, because you did not let 
them give the bread-rations at the (right) time? When my letter reaches you, you 
will find the person who usually gave the bread-rations to the nearby Meshwesh. 
And you should refer it to Akhmenu in order for him to take out the bread-rations 
for the Meshwesh from it. Oh! You should know it.10 
Here the phrase “Oh! You should know it” (jX rX=k sw) functions in the same manner as 
the previous example discussed. It is designed to highlight the social status of the sender 
of the letter, as well as motivate the recipient of the letter. It implicitly suggests that a so-
called “good” subordinate would already know the request and have completed the tasks 
without directives needing to be issued by the superior individual. Again, this is not an 
FTA but a normative utterance for the superior-subordinate relationship dynamic, 
intended to encourage smooth completion of the task. As such, it seems to have become 
a conventionalised linguistic utterance for superiors.  
For harmonious relations between superior and subordinate to be achieved certain 
expectations needed to be met, which have their foundation in the Power imbalance: 
superiors must look after their subordinates, and subordinates must fulfil all requests 
made of them, which benefit their superior (Ridealgh and Jucker 2019: 61‒62). It is, in 
essence, a reciprocal relationship, although one defined and conceived by the elite, with 
both individuals gaining from it.  
In Example (3) below, the same superior linguistic features are observable, but the letter 
also includes a critique of Dhutmose’s behaviour and ability to complete tasks promptly 
(“What you have done is good. Continue to do likewise!”, sw m-Ss p# j.jrj=k j.jrj=k m-mj.tt m-
dwn zp-2), something not found in letters from subordinates to superiors. On one hand 
 
10 P. BN 196 I: Černý (1939: 35); Wente (1967: 52; 1990: 184). 
 
 
Piankh praises Dhutmose’s conduct and prompt completion of directives made to him, 
and, on the other hand, continues to use established superior language formats to 
linguistically reinforce the difference in their status. 
(3) p# (j)m(j)-ro mSo n pr o# onX wD# snb n sS Vry Hno-Dd sDm=j md(w).t [nb] j.h#b=k n=j 
Hr=w p# h#b j.jrj=k r-Dd jry=j oror wp(w.t) nb sHn.w nb n p#y=j nb ntj r-jwd=j bn tw=j 
nny jn=k sw m-Ss p# j.jrj=k j.jrj=k m-mj.tt m-dwn zp-2 wnn So.t spr r=k jw=k oror wp(w.t) 
nb sHn nb jnk ntj r-jwd=k mtw=k jr=w m-dj gm=j n=k bt#.w jX rX=k sw 
The General of the Pharaoh, Life, Prosperity, and Health, to the Scribe of the 
Necropolis Tjaroy. Furthermore, I have heard all the matters you wrote to me 
about. Regarding what you wrote saying: “I completed every task and every 
commission of my lord, which I was assigned and I did not tire” so you said. What 
you have done is good. Continue to do likewise! When my letter reaches you, 
you should complete every task and every commission of mine, which you are 
charged. And you should carry them out. Do not let me find any fault with you. 
Oh! You should know it.11 
It is not just the letters written by Piankh that reflect this superior style of communication, 
Dhutmose is also able to adopt the same stylistic features discussed above with 
subordinate individuals. In a letter to his son Butehamun, he includes the following 
utterance providing judgement on Butehamun’s actions in Example (4).  
(4) Xr m-dj t# mdw n t# qd.t 2 nb.w j.Dd=j [… n=k jm] st r p# pj jw=k tm Dj.t=w jm y# tw=j 
jy.t r […]=j tm gm=w bn nfr p#y j.jrj=k  
Now regarding the matter of the 2 qd.t of gold. I said to you “Put it in the base”. 
You did not place it there. Oh! I have returned to […] but I have not found them. 
It is not good what you did.12 
Within the letters Dhutmose sends his son, negative critiques of Butehamun’s actions 
are rare. The intimacy of their father-son relationship provides a buffer somewhat to the 
more socially distant and formal superior-subordinate dynamic, which can host a range 
of critical linguistic forms (Ridealgh 2020). This is visible, for example, in a letter 
Dhutmose sends to an unknown junior scribe, partially deputising for Dhutmose. This 
letter contains a series of rebukes regarding the actions (or lack thereof) of a subordinate 
individual. Within the superior-subordinate dynamic, Dhutmose can say whatever he 
likes to rebuke the individual and there is no recourse for response (Ridealgh 2013b). 
The language is designed to reassert the social dynamic and embedded expected 
behaviour, as well as motivate the individual to complete the actions issued to them. 
(5) Hno-Dd y# jX p# mdw.t m-dj=k mtw=k tm sDm mtw=k […] sHn n pr-o# onX wD# snb 
p#y=k nb nfr ntj tw=k jm=f 
Furthermore: Indeed! What is the use of speaking to you, if you do not listen, 
and that you remain idle in this commission from Pharaoh, your good lord, in 
which you are engaged? 
(6) Xr Dd(=j) n=k j.[wDj] N.j-sw-cbk p#y=k sS jm Hn=f jrm o# EHw.tj-ms.w sS Jw=f-n-Jmn jm 
jn.tw n# jt bw-pwy sDm n=j 
 
11 P. BN 197 III: Černý 1939: 34; Wente 1967: 52; 1990: 184. 




Now I said to you “Send Nessobek, your scribe, and have him go together with 
the Doorkeeper Dhutmose and the Scribe Efnamun to bring the grain”. But you 
did not listen to me. 
(7) ptr bw jr=k sDm n=j Jmn H#.t=k jnn n#y=k sHn.w oS# r=k bn jw=k rX Sm m p#y sHn n pr-
o# onX wD# snb 
Behold! You don’t listen to me. May Amun be before you. If your commissions 
are too many for you, you know you cannot walk away from the commissions 
from Pharaoh, Life, Prosperity, and Health.13 
In sum, within the ancient Egyptian examples, there are set linguistic forms which could 
be utilised depending on the social status of the recipient of the letter. High-Power 
individuals utilised a much broader range of linguistic and structural features, including 
threats, without needing to take into account the facewants of the recipient — they do 
not exist within the nature of this dynamic. It is also apparent in these examples that 
certain phrases, such as “Oh! You should know it” had become conventionalised and 
part of the expected language use of superior individuals, and, no doubt, were imbued 
with deeper cultural meaning now lost. 
4.2. Old Latin 
Latin, belonging to the Italic branch of the Indo-European linguistic family, is also one of 
the most widely attested languages, and was the first “World language”, widespread all 
over the globe as the language of the Roman Empire and later of the Catholic Church 
(Clackson 2011: 1). Even if nowadays it is a dead language (“Latin is a corpus language, 
known only through written documents, and no one who could genuinely be described 
as a native speaker of Latin has been alive for the last millennium”; ibid.: 2), an important 
number of modern languages derive from it — the Romance languages, such as Italian, 
French, Spanish, Portuguese, Romanian, etc. Its earliest attestations can be dated to 
the seventh century BCE and it is still used by the Holy See. Latin is usually divided into 
the following stages: Archaic and Old Latin, Classical Latin, Late Latin, Medieval Latin 
and Neo-Latin.  
Old Latin, and particularly the language of Roman Comedy (see Karakasis 2014), 
provides us with further linguistic evidence of the concept of Potestas, this time coming 
from the Roman society of 3rd–2nd BCE. The study of Roman society and behaviour 
(including linguistic behaviour) through the comedies of Plautus (c.254–c.184BCE) 
entails several methodological problems, since these are works based upon plays of 
Greek New Comedy, and they present strongly stereotyped characters, and fixed 
dramatic structures and plots. However, linguists very often consider Roman Comedy as 
a valid source for the study of Latin Pragmatics and (im)politeness phenomena.14 . 
Again, one of the most apparent manifestations of Potestas in Latin is the utterance of 
directive speech acts devoid of any mitigating device, which could be interpreted as 
indifference towards the addressee’s (negative) face according to traditional politeness 
approaches (see above, Section 2.1). The following is an example of a set of orders 
given by a master, Euclio, to his servant, a woman called Staphyla: 
(8) [EVC.] Profecto in aedis meas me apsente neminem 
 
13 P. BN 198 III, rt.3‒v.4: Černý 1939: 68–70; Wente 1967: 81–82; 1990: 172–173. 
14 See, for instance, Barrios-Lech (2016), Unceta Gómez (2016), Iurescia (2019); Unceta Gómez 
(2018) presents the state of the art of (Im)politeness Research in Latin. 
 
 
uolo intro mitti. Atque etiam hoc praedico tibi: 
si Bona Fortuna ueniat, ne intro miseris. 
STA. Pol ea ipsa credo ne intro mittatur cauet, 
nam ad aedis nostras nusquam adit quamquam prope. 
EVC. Tace atque abi intro. STA. Taceo atque abeo. [...] (Plautus, Aulularia 
98–103) 
‘[EUC.] In short, I don’t want anybody to be let into my house in my absence. 
There’s another point I want to make: if Good Fortune herself comes, don’t let 
her in. 
STA. I think she herself avoids being let in, because she’s never come 
anywhere near our house. 
EUC. Be quiet and go inside.  
STA. Yes, I am quiet and I am going.’15 
The claim of Euclio’s superiority, evident in his chosen means of expression — the modal 
verb uolo ‘I want’, the performative use of the verb praedico ‘to advise or warn (to)’, the 
bare imperative to silence and move her away, among others —, clearly contrasts with 
the mitigation of the assertion of the slave’s response by means of the verb credo ‘I think’, 
or the expression of obedience in the last line. 
Alongside orders, threats are also one of the most apparent means of performing Power 
(see Limberg 2008; Biscetti 2015).16 In Example (9), from the comedy Amphytruo, the 
master Amphitruo deploys a battery of menaces to his servant Sosia, who is trying to 
explain that he has seen himself at their house (in reality, it is the god Mercury 
impersonating Sosia, just as Jupiter has impersonated Amphitruo to have intercourse 
with the latter’s wife, Alcumena). 
(9) AMPH. Age i tu secundum. SOS. Sequor, supsequor te.  
AMPH. Scelestissimum te arbitror. SOS. Nam quam ob rem?  
AMPH. Quia id quod neque est nec fuit nec futurum est  
mihi praedicas. SOS. Eccere, iam tuatim  
facis, ut tuis nulla apud te fides sit. 
AMPH. Quid est? Quo modo? Iam quidem hercle ego tibi istam 
scelestam, scelus, linguam abscidam. SOS. Tuos sum,  
proinde ut commodum est et lubet quidque facias;  
tamen quin loquar haec uti facta sunt hic, 
numquam ullo modo me potes deterrere. 
AMPH. Scelestissume, audes mihi praedicare id, 
domi te esse nunc, qui hic ades? SOS. Vera dico. 
AMPH. Malum quod tibi di dabunt, atque ego hodie 
dabo… SOS. Istuc tibi est in manu, nam tuos sum. 
AMPH. Tun me, uerbero, audes erum ludificari? (Plautus, Amphytruo 551–
565). 
‘AMPH. Come on, walk behind me.  
SOS. I’m following you, I’m following you closely. 
AMPH. I think you’re a hardened criminal.  
SOS. But why? 
 
15 Text and translations of Plautine texts are those of de Melo (2011a, 2011b). 
16 The same could be said about insults, such as scelestissume ‘hardened criminal’ in (9); see 
Gaide (2001: 961). 
 
 
AMPH. Because you’re telling me something that doesn’t exist, hasn’t existed, 
and won’t exist. 
SOS. Look, now you’re behaving in your typical way, not trusting your servants 
at all. 
AMPH. What’s that? How so? I’ll cut you this villainous tongue of yours this 
instant, you villain.  
SOS. I’m yours; you can do anything that’s convenient and to your taste; still, 
you can never deter me in any way from saying what really happened. 
AMPH. You hardened criminal, you dare tell me that you, who are here, are 
at home now? 
SOS. I’m telling the truth.  
AMPH. The bad time which the gods will give you today, and I too… 
SOS. That’s in your hand: I’m yours. 
AMPH. You whipping post, do you dare to poke fun at me, your master?’ 
Notwithstanding the slave’s insistence in the veracity of his words, he accepts with 
resignation his master’s superiority and his capacity (and legitimacy) to inflict upon him 
the punishment commensurate with his decision (“I’m yours; you can do anything that’s 
convenient and to your taste” Tuos sum, proinde ut commodum est et lubet quidque 
facias; “That’s in your hand: I’m yours” Istuc tibi est in manu, nam tuos sum), whereas 
Amphitruo keeps on speaking in a menacing manner to obtain a certain response. In this 
case, Sosia’s behaviour is essential for the progress of the plot but does not question his 
master’s authority. The following verses, pronounced by the old man Periplectomenus, 
clearly illustrates this point:17 
(10) PER. Seruiendae seruituti ego seruos instruxi mihi, 
hospes, non qui mi imperarent quibusue ego essem obnoxius: 
si illis aegre est mihi [id] quod uolup est, meo remigio rem gerunt, 
tamen id quod odio est faciundum est cum malo atque ingratiis. (Plautus, Miles 
gloriosus 745–748). 
‘PER. I’ve schooled my slaves to serve me, my guest, not to order me around 
or for me to be obliged to them. Even if they’re upset at what I enjoy, they do 
their job under my direction and they still have to do what they hate, with 
beatings and against their wishes.’ 
The comedies also show a frequent phenomenon of inversion of hierarchical relations, 
in which young masters entrust themselves to their clever slaves to help them to fulfil 
their romantic aims. This phenomenon is illustrated in (11):18 
(11) LEO. Auscultate atque operam date et mea dicta deuorate.  
primum omnium seruos tuos nos esse non negamus; 
sed tibi si uiginti minae argenti proferentur, 
quo nos uocabis nomine? ARG. Libertos. LEO. Non patronos? 
ARG. Id potius. LEO. Viginti minae hic insunt in crumina, 
has ego, si uis, <nunc> tibi dabo. ARG. Di te seruassint semper, 
custos erilis, decus popli, thensaurus copiarum,  
[…] 
 
17 Another interesting example, Stultitia est ei te esse tristem quoius potestas plus potest. 
(Plautus, Casina 282) ‘It’s stupidity to be sulky with someone who has greater authority’, is a clear 
admonition, uttered by a freeman to a slave, on the necessity of respecting and obeying those 
who are invested with power. 
18 As McCarthy (2000) has extensively analysed, in Roman comedy two modes of representation 
of hierarchical relations coexist: a “naturalistic mode” and a “farcical mode”. 
 
 
hic pone, hic istam colloca cruminam in collo plane. 
LEO. Nolo ego te, qui erus sis, mihi onus istuc sustinere. 
ARG. Quin tu labore liberas te atque istam imponis in me? 
LEO. Ego baiulabo, tu, ut decet dominum, ante me ito inanis. 
[...] 
LEO. Hanc, cui daturu's hanc, iube petere atque orare mecum. (Plautus, 
Asinaria 649–662) 
‘ARG. Listen, you two, pay attention, and devour my words. First of all we 
don’t deny that we’re your slaves. But if you get twenty silver minas, by what 
name will you call us? 
ARG. Freedmen. 
LEO. Not patrons? 
ARG. That rather. 
LEO. There is twenty minas here in this wallet. (holds it up) I’ll give it to you 
now if you want to. 
ARG. May the gods prosper you always, guardian of your master, glory of the 
people, storehouse of riches, […]. Put it here, place this wallet here plainly on 
my neck. 
LEO. I don’t want you to bear this burden for me, since you’re my master. 
ARG. Why don’t you free yourself from the strain and put this onto me? 
LEO. I will carry it, you, as is appropriate for a master, should go in front of me 
empty handed. 
[…] 
LEO. Tell the woman you’re going to give it to ask for it and to plead with me.’ 
As can be understood from Example (11), the master’s dependence on the servant 
(Leonida) to achieve his goals explains the fact that the former (Argyrippus) assumes a 
subservient language (see, for instance, the intensive expression of gratitude through a 
blessing and hyperbolic compliments), and the latter clearly expresses his (contextual 
and transitory) Power, although with a sarcastic explicit expression of the kind of 
relationship they all are in. This inversion of hierarchies confirms (even if mockingly) the 
existence of characterizing features in the language of both superiors and inferiors.  
All these examples illustrate the more assertive and powerful linguistic styles of 
superiors,19 and the disregard to the “face” of the slaves, the main existence of which 
was even denied in that society by the elite. As Kaster (2005: 23) puts it, “slaves — at 
least according to the ideology of Roman slavery — have no autonomous volition, hence 
no actual self, hence no face to maintain or lose”. This negation, according to Stewart 
(2012), strengthens and legitimates the Roman slave system. As she points out: 
The slave-holder creates and promotes representations of the slave and slave 
behavior that legitimate his domination. The slave system cannot recognize or 
represent the slave as an autonomous subject because to do so fundamentally 
contradicts the logic of slavery. The effectiveness of slavery as a system of 
domination depended on naturalizing the overwhelming, coercive power as both 
temperate and moral, as normal and natural. In other words, both the master’s 
honorable capacity to exercise unilateral coercive authority and the slave’s 
capacity — as a subordinated yet still thinking subject — to act morally as a subject 
 
19 See also Barrios-Lech (2016: 215–232), who presents other pieces of evidence of the language 
of domination in Roman comedy. 
 
 
only when obedient to the master were fundamental to the success of the Roman 
slave system. (Stewart 2012: 8) 
Thus, in sum, it can be said that there exists in Old Latin certain linguistic expressions 
that index a hierarchical superiority of the speaker with regard to the addressee. This 
behaviour, assuming the “non-existence” of the slave’s face, is not, technically speaking, 
a show of impoliteness, given that there is no place for the consideration of certain acts 
as Face-Threatening. Certainly, it could be argued that low-Power individuals do indeed 
have face, but they are not in a position to protest. Still, even if the preserved evidence 
probably offers a very limited picture of the actual situation, given that it was written by 
members of the elite in closed connection with their own values, the fact that the evidence 
we have access to presents that value system heavily supports the idea that in ancient 
societies the Power of the elite had a radical importance. 
5. Discussions and concluding remarks 
Deference and Potestas, as contrary but complementary sides of Discernment, are 
reflexes of behavioural and linguistic normative dimensions oriented towards the 
reinforcement and perpetuation of existing Power relations. As such, the low-Power 
individual has no linguistic pathways or opportunities to renegotiate the Power dynamic: 
it is culturally fixed. Yet the utterance is not interpreted as impolite either, the high-Power 
individual has neither caused offence that would damage their own face nor damaged 
the low-Power individual’s face, simply because within this dynamic, the low-Power 
individual does not possess a public face — in essence, their facewants, and face itself, 
are over-ridden by Power. This is of course dependent on the relationship. An individual, 
as highlighted above with the Egyptian data, can be both a superior and a subordinate, 
adopting the differing linguistic expectations and “rights” of these roles. The Latin data 
used here is slightly different in that, on the one hand, the social relations in Plautus’ 
comedies are rigidly and schematically depicted, and, on the other hand, the stock 
character of the astute slave, upon whom a young person in love depends, usually takes 
the reins and assumes a powerful style of talk for the sake of comic relief. This comic 
inversion of hierarchies confirms, as we have seen, the descriptive capacity of Potestas 
as a theoretical second-order concept in interpersonal pragmatics. 
From a linguistic perspective, the relationship inequality is manifested in the language 
used to host this dynamic and of course to foster and maintain it. This relationship 
maintenance is not realised by a need to meet individual facewants, but rather the 
expected application of culturally appropriate language between high-Power and low-
Power individuals or actors. This is a direct result, as we said before, of the Power 
imbalance between superior and subordinate individuals, where the high-Power 
individual does not need to satisfy the facewants of the low-Power individual. It is simply 
not necessary for the successful continuation of the relationship. Rather, this is 
dependent on the resources each party can provide, particularly the high-Power 
individual. 
Despite the criticism they received, due to its grounding in Brown and Levinson’s (1987) 
classical model, Politeness Research has predominantly focused on the strategic 
features of politeness, somehow obscuring the normative dimension underlying a certain 
linguistic behaviour, a gap partly covered by the theory of Discernment politeness (see 
above, Section 2.2). The focus on ancient linguacultures allows us to re-emphasise the 
importance of ignored behavioural patterns conceived within those societies as social 
 
 
norms. In essence this means that, although certain utterances can be deemed as FTAs 
under Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model (see Section 2.1), within the model of 
Potestas, no face aggravation occurs as the low-Power individual is devoid of it, as we 
see in both the Egyptian and Roman contexts. If, from an emic perspective (politeness1), 
this linguistic pattern was not understood as impolite, we cannot include it under the label 
“impoliteness” (even if, as observed in the examples above, there is an apparent lack of 
politeness). Thus, the linguistic behaviour encapsulated in the concept of Potestas 
cannot be considered, strictly speaking, impolite, rather it belongs to the realm of “non-
politeness” or politic behaviour (in Locher and Watts’ 2005 terminology). 
A point for further discussion beyond what we argue here stems from how Power is 
viewed in second order politeness approaches. Within the dynamics of many 
interpersonal interactions within ancient societies and languages, as exemplified in 
Section 4, there was no pretention to mitigate the expression of Power; on the contrary, 
the custom was to emphasise it, given the ideological functions of some linguistic 
features. In contrast, modern European languages tend to allow for the negotiation of 
Power, with the exception of certain fossilised expressions of submission, which have 
become conventionalised linguistic forms used regardless of the hierarchical relation 
between the interlocutors (Held 1999). The linguistic and cultural displays of Potestas 
seems to have faded, perhaps in part due to the increasing egalitarianism of Western 
societies, the prevalence of symmetry in social relationships (see, e.g., Schwartz 1994; 
Morand 1996, 2000), and the identification of authoritarianism with impoliteness.20 As 
Locher (2004: 37) puts it, “[a] society’s ideologies, however, can also obscure the 
exercise of power to such an extent that it is no longer recognized as power”. Once the 
expression of Power became a “taboo”, deference strategies evolved predominantly to 
express social Distance. It could even be argued that this perception of the linguistic 
display of Power as unacceptable reached the theorization of politeness phenomena,21 
which has largely disregarded the linguistic behaviour of superiors — as Yabuuchi (2006) 
highlights, Brown and Levinson refused to reflect in their model the importance of 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, it is our claim that a powerful style of talk, which neglects some 
(pretended universal) guidelines of facework, can be simply understood as a show of the 
expected behaviour of powerful individuals in a given setting. Thus, introducing the 
notion of Potestas into (Im)politeness Research allows for a more nuanced analysis of 
interactions, especially those which fall between the boundaries of politeness and 
impoliteness. 
Unequal Power relations may be more palpable in ancient cultures (given their stronger 
and explicit hierarchical ideology) but are certainly recognizable in modern societies. In 
contrast to Locher’s (2004: 33) view, who proposes that “a person’s higher status does 
not in itself mean that he or she can automatically exercise power over a person with 
lower status. It is thus an oversimplification to equate power with hierarchical status”, we 
claim that, in ancient societies (but certainly not only within them), both categories are 
closely related, the latter being the main support for the former. The correlation between 
 
20 It would be worth diachronically exploring the origins of this behavioral pattern, which could 
maybe have to do with some Christian values, such as ‘mercy’ (Biscetti 2015: 301–302). A 
comparison with non-Western linguacultures and linguistic habits regarding Power would also 
shed some extra light to the concept of Potestas. 
21 The normative dimension of second-order Politeness Research is criticised by Eelen (2001), 
for example.  
 
 
impoliteness and Power has been well stated by recent research (see the papers 
collected in Bousfield and Locher 2008). It has also been observed that certain 
institutions favour a “sanctioned” aggressive or impolite behavioural approach (Watts 
2003: 259–269), such as the army (see Bousfield 2008)22 or, more generally speaking, 
the workplace (Schnurr et al. 2008: esp. 216). In these situations, however, it must be 
admitted that “when we wield power we are not necessarily being impolite” (Bousfield 
2008: 150). In several interactional contexts, an asymmetric distribution of Power, 
especially in highly institutionalized settings, implies a linguistic behaviour enacting 
Power, which includes omitting facework strategies, but is not necessarily viewed as 
impoliteness either (see also Haugh 2013). Potestas could therefore be a useful 
theoretical tool to tackle this kind of linguistic behaviour in modern languages and 
societies, and to offer an integrated account of Power within (im)politeness theories, a 
possibility that needs further research. 
In conclusion, we propose that Potestas is a phenomenon that encapsulates an expected 
discursive practice by superiors towards their subordinates that is not polite nor impolite, 
and has its foundation in the indexing of Power in superior-subordinate relationships. 
The impact of Power within this dynamic is more straightforward to determine in ancient 
languages, as hierarchy was a dominant feature of ancient societies and Power was a 
fixed and non-negotiable feature rooted in specific social institutions and cultural 
practices. Thus, analysing historically remote cultures allows us to consider that, under 
certain circumstances, Power is a static and predictable variable, which, in the case of 
Historical (Im)politeness Research, facilitates the task of making predictions about 
linguistic behaviour of individuals. This is also true in modern societies, where, bosses, 
judges, policemen, teachers, doctors, parents and any other individual (institutionally or 
contextually) invested with Power can assume “powerful styles of talk” (Bradac and 
Street 1989/90), that, even if getting into dynamics of negotiation of public image, do not 
necessarily threaten the addressee’s face. Therefore, we can include Potestas as part 
of the politic behaviour of specific cultures, of specific communities of practice, or even 
specific relations between individuals. We can also conclude that Historical 
(Im)politeness Research and the focus on discursive practices and linguistic styles of 
remote cultures can illuminate — perhaps more straightforwardly than the intercultural 
comparison (as, e.g., Spencer-Oatey 1997) — the understanding of certain linguistic 
behaviours in modern languages, whose interpretations have sometimes been affected 
by ideological issues. 
 
References 
Allen, James P., 2001. Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture of 
Hieroglyphs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Assmann, Jan, 1990. Ma`at. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im alten Ägypten. Munich: C.H. 
Beck. 
 
22 As Bousfield (2008: 143) states, “[T]he British Army philosophy (like the philosophies of many 
military forces the world over) is predicated on the belief that the hierarchy of power is necessarily 
rigid, concrete and inflexible — for the good of all within the service and for its effectiveness as 
an organisation. As such, the recruits’ understanding of who is on top of the power structure, and 
who on the bottom, needs to be very clear and totally unambiguous”. 
 
 
Barrios-Lech, Peter, 2016. Linguistic Interaction in Roman Comedy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Biscetti, Stefania, 2015. Power, (im)politeness and aggressiveness in early modern master-
servant relations (1660–1759). Journal of Early Modern Studies 4: 287–314. 
Bradac, James J. and Richard L. Street, Jr. 1989/90. Powerful and powerless styles of talk: A 
theoretical analysis of language and impression formation. Research on Language and 
Social Interaction 23: 195–242. 
Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson, 1987. Politeness. Some Universals in Language 
Usage. (Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics 4). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, Roger, and Albert Gilman, 1960. Pronouns of power and solidarity. In T. A. Sebeok (ed.). 
Style in Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 253–276. 
Bousfield, Derek, 2008. Impoliteness in the struggle for power. In Derek Bousfield and Miriam 
Locher (eds.). Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and 
Practice. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 255–280. 
Bousfield, Derek and Miriam Locher (eds.), 2008. Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its 
Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 
Černý, Jaroslav, 1939. Late Ramesside Letters. Bibliotheca Aegyptiaca 9. Brussels: Fondation 
égyptologique reine Élisabeth. 
Conlan, Christopher, 2005. Face threatening acts, primary face threatening acts, and the 
management of discourse: Australian English and speakers of Asian Englishes. In Robin 
Lakoff and Ide Sachiko (eds.). Broadening the horizon of linguistic politeness. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 129–144. 
Clackson, James, 2011. Introduction. In James Clackson (ed.), A Companion to the Latin 
Language, Wiley-Blackwell: Malden, MA/Oxford/Chichester, 1–6. 
De Melo, Wolfgang, 2011a. Plautus. Amphitryon. The Comedy of Asses. The Pot of Gold. The 
Two Bacchises. The Captives. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
De Melo, Wolfgang, 2011b. Plautus. The Merchant. The Braggart Soldier. The Ghost. The 
Persian. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
Eelen, Gino, 2001. A Critique of Politeness Theories. Manchester/Northampton, MA: St. Jerome. 
Emerson, Richard M., 1962. Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review 27.1: 
31–41. 
Foucault, Michel, 1976. Histoire de la Sexualité I: La Volonté de Savoir. Gallimard: Paris. (English 
translation: The History of Sexuality, vol. I: An Introduction. Vintage Books: New York, 1980). 
Gaide, Françoise, 2001. A propos des interactions verbales dans le théâtre de Plaute. In Claude 
Moussy (ed.), De lingua latina, novae quaestiones. Actes du Xè Colloque International de 
linguistique Latine. Louvain/Paris/Sterling, VA: Peeters, 959–970. 
Gotter, Ulrich, 2008. Cultural differences and cross-cultural contact: Greek and Roman concepts 
of power. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 104: 179–230. 
Haugh, Michael, 2013. Disentangling face, facework and im/politeness. Pragmática Sociocultural 
/ Sociocultural Pragmatics 1.1: 46–73. 
Harris, Sandra, 2003. Politeness and Power: Making and responding to ‘requests’ in institutional 
settings. Text: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse 23.1: 27–52. 
Held, Gudrun, 1999. Submission strategies as an expression of the ideology of politeness: 
Reflections on the verbalisation of social power relations. Pragmatics 9.1: 21–36. 
Hill, Beverly, Sachiko Ide, Shoko Ikuta, Akiko Kawasaki and Tsunao Ogino, 1986. Universals of 
linguistic politeness: Quantitative evidence from Japanese and American English. Journal of 
Pragmatics 10: 347–371. 
Hofstede, Geert, 1986. Cultural differences in teaching and learning. International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations 10: 301–320. 
Holmes, Janet, and Maria Stubbe, 2003. Power and Politeness in the Workplace. A Sociolinguistic 
Analysis of Talk at Work. London: Longman. 
Ide, Sachiko, 1989. Formal forms and Discernment: two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness. 
Multilingua 8.2/3: 223–248. 
 
 
Ide, Sachiko, 1992. On the notion of “wakimae”: Toward an integrated framework of linguistic 
politeness. In: Michiko Takeuchi (ed.). Kotoba no mozaiku. Collection of Papers in Honor of 
Professor Natsuko Okuda. Tokyo: Mejiro Linguistic Society, 298–305. 
Iurescia, Federica, 2019. Credo iam ut solet iurgabit: Pragmatica della lite a Roma. Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Junge, Friedrich, 2005. Late Egyptian Grammar: An Introduction. Translated by David Warburton. 
2nd ed. Griffith Institute Publications. Oxford: The Griffith Institute. 
Kádár, Dániel Z., and Sara Mills, 2013. Rethinking Discernment. Journal of Politeness Research 
9.2: 133–158. 
Kádár, Dániel Z., and Annick Paternoster, 2015. Historicity in metapragmatics: A study on 
“Discernment” in Italian metadiscourse. Pragmatics 25.3: 369–391. 
Kádár, Dániel Z., and Kim Ridealgh, 2019. Introduction. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 20.2: 
169-185. 
Karakasis, Evangelos, 2014. The language of the palliata. In Michael Fontaine and Adele C. 
Scafuro (eds.), The Oxford handbook of Greek and Roman Comedy. Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 555–579. 
Keltner, Dacher, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Serena Chen and Michael W. Kraus, 2008. A reciprocal 
influence model of social power: Emerging principles and lines of inquiry. Advances in 
Experimental Social Phychology 40: 151–192. 
Leech, Geoffrey, 2014. The Pragmatics of Politeness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leezenberg, Michiel, 2002. Power in communication: implications for the semantics-pragmatics 
interface. Journal of Pragmatics 34: 893–908. 
Limberg, Holger, 2008. Threats in conflict talk: Impoliteness and manipulation. In Derek Bousfield 
and Miriam Locher (eds.). Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its Interplay with Power in 
Theory and Practice. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 155–179. 
Locher, Miriam, 2004. Power and Politeness in Action. Disagreements in Oral Communication. 
Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Locher, Miriam, 2015. Interpersonal Pragmatics and its link to (im)politeness research. Journal of 
Pragmatics 86: 5-10. 
Locher, Miriam and Richard J. Watts, 2005. Politeness theory and relational work. Journal of 
Politeness Research 1.1: 9–33. 
Matsumoto, Yoshiko, 1988. Reexamination of the universality of face: politeness phenomena in 
Japanese. Journal of Pragmatics 12: 403–426. 
Matsumoto, Yoshiko, 1989. Politeness and conversational universals: observations from 
Japanese. Multilingua 8: 207–221. 
Matsumoto, Yoshiko, 1993. Linguistic politeness and cultural style: observations. In Clancy, P.M. 
(ed.) Japanese and Korean Linguistics. Vol. 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 55–67. 
McCarthy, Kathleen, 2000. Slaves, Masters and the Art of Authority in Plautine Comedy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Molm, Linda, 1997. Coercive Power in Social Exchanges. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Morand, David, 1996. Dominance, Deference, and Egalitarianism in Organizational Interaction: A 
Sociolinguistic analysis of power and politeness. Organization Science 7.5: 544‒556. 
Morand, David, 2000. Language and power: an empirical analysis of linguistic strategies used in 
superior–subordinate communication. Journal of Organizational Behaviour 21: 235–248. 
Mullany, Louise, 2004. Gender, politeness and institutional power roles: Humour as a tactic to 
gain compliance in workplace business meetings. Multilingua 23.1–2: 13–37.  
Pizziconi, Barbara, 2003. Re-examining politeness, face and the Japanese language. Journal of 
Pragmatics 35: 1471–1506. 
Ridealgh, Kim, 2013a. ‘Yes Sir!’ An Analysis of the Superior/Subordinate Relationship in the Late 
Ramesside Letters. Lingua Aegyptia: Journal of Egyptian Language Studies 21: 181–206. 
Ridealgh, Kim, 2013b. You Do Not Listen to Me! Facework and the Position of ‘Senior’ Scribe of 
the Necropolis? Journal of Ancient Civilization 28: 22–40. 
 
 
Ridealgh, Kim, 2016. Polite like an Egyptian? Case studies of politeness in the Late Ramesside 
Letters. Journal of Politeness Research 12.2: 245–266. 
Ridealgh, Kim, 2020. ‘Look after him in the night’ – Exploring the linguistic manifestation of the 
father/son relationship dynamic. In Shih-Wei Hsu, Vincent Pierre-Michel Laisney, and Jan 
Moje (eds.). Ein Kundiger der in die Gottesworte eingedrugen ist: Festschrift für den 
Ägyptologen Karl Jansen-Winkeln zum 65 Geburstag. Münster: Zaphon, 263‒272. 
Ridealgh, Kim, and Andreas Jucker, 2019. Late Egyptian, Old English and the re-evaluation of 
Discernment politeness in remote cultures. Journal of Pragmatics 144: 56‒66. 
Schnurr, Meredith Marra and Janet Holmes, 2008. Impoliteness as a means of contesting and 
challenging power relations in the workplace. In Derek Bousfield and Miriam Locher (eds.). 
Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice. 
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 211–230. 
Schwartz, Shalom H., 1994. Beyond individualism/collectivism. New cultural dimensions of 
values. In Uichol Kim, Harry C. Triandis, Çigdem Kâğitçibaşi, Sang-Chin Choi and Gene 
Yoon (eds). Individualism and Collectivism. Theory, Method, and Applications. London: 
Sage, 85–119. 
Shen, Xingchen and Xinren Chen, 2019. Doing Power Threatening Acts (PTAs) in ancient China. 
An empirical study of Chinese jian discourse. Journal of Historical Pragmatics 20.1: 132–
156. 
Sifianou, Maria, 2011. On the concept of Face and Politeness. In Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini 
and Dániel Kádár (eds.). Politeness across Cultures. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 42‒
58. 
Simpson, William Kelly, 2003. The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, Instruction 
and Poetry. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Searle, John, 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. Free Press, New York. 
Spencer-Oatey, Helen, 1996. Reconsidering Power and Distance. Journal of Pragmatics 26: 1–
24. 
Spencer-Oatey, Helen, 1997. Unequal relationships in High and Low power distance societies: A 
comparison of Tutor-Student role relations in Britain and China. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 28.3: 284–302. 
Stewart, Roberta, 2012. Plautus and Roman Slavery. Malden-Oxford-Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Sweeney, Deborah, 2001. Correspondence and Dialogue: Pragmatic Factors in Late Ramesside 
Letter Writing. Ägypten und Altes Testament: Studien zu Geschichte, Kultur und Religion 
Ägyptens und des Alten Testaments 49. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. 
Terkourafi, Marina, 1999. Frames for politeness: A case study. Pragmatics 9.1: 97–117. 
Terkourafi, Marina, 2005. An argument for a frame-based approach to politeness: Evidence from 
the use of the imperative in Cypriot Greek. In Robin Lakoff and Ide Sachiko (eds.). 
Broadening the horizon of linguistic politeness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 99–116. 
Thibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelley, 1959. The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: 
Wiley. 
Unceta Gómez, Luis, 2016. Congratulations in Latin Comedy: Types and functions. Journal of 
Politeness Research 12.2: 267–290 
Unceta Gómez, Luis, 2018. Gli studi sulla (s)cortesia linguistica in latino. Possibilità di analisi e 
proposte per il futuro. Studi e Saggi Linguistici 56.2: 9–37. 
Vine, Bernadette, 2004. Getting Things Done at Work. The discourse of power in workplace 
interaction. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Watts, Richard J., 2003. Politeness (Key Topics in Sociolinguistics). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wente, Edward Frank, 1967. Late Ramesside Letters. Oriental Institute of Chicago Studies in 
Ancient Oriental Civilisation 33. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wente, Edward Frank, 1990. Letters from Ancient Egypt, edited by E. Meltzer. Society of Biblical 
Literature: Writings from the Ancient World 1. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
 
Yabuuchi, Akio, 2006. Hierarchy politeness: What Brown and Levinson refused to see. Journal of 
Intercultural Pragmatics 3.3: 323‒351. 
